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On 5 December 1997, most daily newspapers in Slovakia reported the 
statement of European Parliament deputy A. Oostlander regarding Slovakia’s 
dismal accession status to the European Union (EU): "You either have to 
change your opinion, or change the government".1 According to Slovak Prime 
Minister Vladimir Meciar, the statement constituted an unprecedented 
interference in the internal affairs of Slovakia, and Oostlander’s behavior was 
unprofessional, irresponsible, and unfit for a member of the European 
Parliament. Meciar said that the call for the dismissal of a democratically- 
elected government contravened all accepted international norms, and called 
the affair another example of the double standards applied to Slovakia. Deputy 
Prime Minister Marian Huska was quick to contend that Slovakia is treated as a 
second-class state because it refused to become the vassal of rich and powerful 
western countries. A promise of vigilant protection of the Slovak national 
interest concluded Huska’s emotional statement.2
This exchange of opinions raises several questions. First, are the 
methods used by the EU to evaluate applicants arbitrary? Even though the 
evaluation of applicants usually corresponds to their economic and political 
status, some instances of arbitrariness would be difficult to dispute. Turkey, for 
instance, appears to be at least as well prepared for accession as Cyprus: yet 
while the former remains on the sidelines, the latter is a leading candidate for 
the next enlargement. Latvia and Lithuania could note that although Estonia’s 
citizenship policies toward the Russian minority are more discriminatory then 
theirs, they have been told to wait Estonia was invited to begin negotiations.3
Second, can a change of government resolve a country’s democratic 
deficit? While some of the literature on transition to democracy suggests that 
democratization takes place from the top down,4 it is hard to imagine that a 
change of government through means other that free and fair elections would 
lead to more democracy. In short, until now there were no viable alternatives 
who would be able to compete effectively with Meciar in elections. Moreover, 
attempts by external parties to replace a standing government are likely to 
backfire. Finally, given the strong correlation between democracy and 
economic growth, governments which promote growth can indirectly facilitate 
democratization in the long run.5
This leads to a third question: should accession criteria be applied 
equally to all applicants?6 The nature of external influence on democratization 
is important not only because some applicants are more stable and prosperous 
than others, but also because their institutions may be more or less compatible 



























































































stable and prosperous, with institutions least compatible with those of the ELI, 
are expected to make the most rapid and fundamental changes if they wish to 
be considered. The question is whether these countries are likely to achieve 
political stability and economic prosperity through such changes.
Contrary to the "democratization through incorporation and 
convergence" thesis,8 the vision of accession to the EU will lead to different 
results in different polities, because in some societies the perceived costs are 
greater than the expected benefits. The evaluation criteria therefore should be 
adapted to individual countries and applied with greater flexibility. The 
resulting "differentiated integration"9 could benefit all involved parties. Even if 
a temporary retreat from EU standards will not make countries more 
democratic in the short run, it is likely to increase the EU’s influence over the 
nature of change and the eventual democratic consolidation in the long run, and 
it would reduce uncertainty and transaction costs involved in the process.10 
This occurs because rapid and fundamental changes create institutions that do 
not correspond with the pre-existing, often deeply embedded rules of the game. 
Consequently, social, political and economic interaction takes place through a 
set of informal, rather that through the new, super-imposed formal 
institutions."
A comprehensive analysis of the EU’s approach to the evaluation of 
new members would go beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, I shall focus 
on the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, more specifically on their 
approximation policies (and the evaluation thereof) in the sphere of citizenship 
policy. A comparison of the two countries is useful, because they have a 
common experience of communism, they shared the same state between 1918 
and 1992, and because their chances for membership at the moment of the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 appeared roughly equal. Today, 
however, the Czech Republic is inj while Slovakia is out of the first round of 
accession negotiations/2 A comparison of the post-1993 developments in the 
two countries, therefore, might reveal to what degree changes in their accession 
status result from inconsistencies in evaluation and accession strategies at the 
EU level, and to what degree from changes at the domestic level.
It also seems profitable to focus on the citizenship policy. First, the 
concepts of citizenship, nationhood and democracy are intimately connected. 
Consequently, while the focus on citizenship policy makes the analytical and 
empirical work more manageable, it also remains relevant for the 
democratization literature, and brings in the dimension of external influence on 
the process. The link between citizenship and the understanding of nationhood 
is related to the degree of tolerance toward the members of other nations. It is 
often argued that when the definition of nationhood is derived from primordial 




























































































citizens and ethnic minorities.13 The nature of relations between the state and 
the citizens is reflected in the nature of consultations between the state and its 
citizens, and in the extent to which citizens are protected from arbitrary 
action.14
Second, a systematic analysis of citizenship policy on the domestic 
level can provide useful information for the evaluation of candidates. Contrary' 
to Pridham and Pinder, who argue that candidates should fulfill the criteria of 
market economy and pluralist democracy before accession, Grabbe and Hughes 
favor flexibility of criteria and differentiated integration.15 Information on 
citizenship policy can be used to develop specific accession strategies for 
specific candidates. Both the evaluation and the accession strategies are 
important: while the former can account for the nature of societal attitudes 
toward foreigners, the latter can prevent EU policies with undesired outcomes 
and limit the uncertainty involved in EU expansion and domestic 
democratization.
Finally, while Article 8 of the Treaty of European Union16 revived the 
academic debate on changing understanding of citizenship in contemporary 
Western democracies, a surprisingly insignificant part of this debate focuses on 
post-communist countries. This deficiency is a disturbing mainly because 
Western paradigms may not always fit when applied in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE). Following a review of arguments on citizenship,
I will define the relevant concepts, and outline a theoretical framework in 
which relations between nationhood, citizenship, democracy and the EU 
integration can be analyzed. I will then compare the evaluations of the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia in "Agenda 2000", and point out inconsistencies. I will 
argue that inconsistencies in evaluation are, at least in part, the result of two 
methodological problems: the absence of comprehensive definitions and 
analytical frameworks; and the EU’s consequent ignorance of the domestic 
constraints of applicants. In part, however, inconsistencies can be traced 
directly to the lack of desire of EU leaders to sit down and negotiate with 
political figures such as Vladimir Meciar.18 I will conclude that the EU 
strategies of eastward enlargement hinge on a paradox where the EU demands 
the most substantial changes from the countries that are the least fit to carry 
them out; and thus that all involved parties could benefit from the réévaluation 
of these demands.
I. Citizenship, Nationhood, Democracy and European Integration: 
Concepts and Definitions
Two different currents of the scholarship on citizenship shall be considered in 




























































































citizens, and the Union.19 Its arguments could be divided into three categories, 
where citizenship is understood respectively (1) as rights and obligations that 
establish an individual’s membership of a nation-state, (2) as membership in 
any space outside of the nation-state where individual and collective rights can 
be legitimated, or (3) as rights and obligations that place the individual 
somewhere between the first two possibilities.
The second broad current of scholarship treats the relationship between 
citizenship and democracy. Two distinct approaches can be identified here. In 
the first approach, developed by T. H. Marshall, the extension of equal 
political, civil, and social rights to citizens led gradually to the destruction of 
old status-based hierarchies and ultimately to democracy.20 Charles Tilly, on 
the other hand, disputes the progressive, linear, and evolutionary character of 
citizenship. Tilly argues that the democratic component of citizenship is, first, 
the result of a bargaining process between rulers and ruled which began in 
eighteenth-century western Europe; and, second, the consequence of the 
emulation of the "Western model" nation-states which were founded at a later 
point.211 will review these arguments below, and then propose a framework for 
a relational definition of citizenship that incorporates nationhood and 
democracy. Finally, I will suggest a method of evaluating the degree of 
democracy.
Citizenship, Nationhood, and European Integration
Scholars who understand citizenship as a membership of a nation state view 
European citizenship with skepticism.22 Raymond Aron believed that European 
citizenship is impossible for structural reasons, because it would have to 
involve the transfer of political and legal powers from the national level, and 
such a transfer would require a sustained popular demand for European 
Federation.'3 Rogers Brubaker argues that citizenship is likely to remain a 
bastion of national sovereignty, because its definitions continue to reflect a 
deeply rooted understanding of nationhood.24 Both views are supported by 
Charles Tilly. Tilly sees citizenship as one of the underlying organizational 
features of modem nation-states, and concludes that it is unlikely to shed its 
close relationship to nationhood, because the construction of new 
organizational relations entails substantial transaction costs.25
The second group of scholars dismisses the contemporary idea of 
citizenship as merely membership of a nation-state. Yasemin Soysal and David 
Jacobson point to the changing conventional characterization of citizenship. 
They argue that international migration, supranational associations, and the 
nearly universal acceptance of basic human rights constitute an alternative 
space for legitimization of individual and collective rights. From their point of 




























































































of goods, services, capital and people — cannot be considered a major obstacle 
to European integration.26
The third strand of explanations agrees that the contemporary 
conception of citizenship in Europe has inched away from the conventional, 
national understanding. Yet these authors by no means share the optimism of 
Soysal and Jacobson concerning the irrelevance of the conventional conception 
of citizenship for European integration. Some of them point to the rising 
fortunes of European nationalist parties at the ballot box, and suggest that many 
individuals wish neither to abandon national citizenship as traditionally 
understood, nor share its benefits with foreigners.27 Hence, integrative 
pressures from the EU, some argue, actually contributed to the racialization of 
citizenship policies, and even threaten the well established inclusive and non­
ethnic principles of national citizenship laws.28 This view is supported by 
empirical research that points to a correlation between cycles of economic 
decline in the member states, with instances of rising resentment toward 
foreigners, and a declining support for European integration.29 Finally, 
Baldwin-Edwards, Baubock and Meehan argue that the Citizenship of the 
Union has had little impact on the legalization of migrant and guest workers of 
non-member states, it continues to limit the movement of unemployed and 
young people,30 and has not yet provided the anticipated stimulus for the much 
desired harmonization of voting and naturalization laws of member states.31
At the same time, according,to Meehan, the new citizenship is neither 
national nor cosmopolitan, but multiple in that “identities, rights and 
obligations associated with citizenship are expressed through an increasingly 
complex configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and 
transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions."32 Yet, 
the new rights and obligations in most cases predated the conception of 
European Citizenship, making it a post hoc construction with spurious 
legitimacy and credibility. Those who attribute the relaxation of naturalization 
laws in traditionally strict countries like Germany33 or the trends toward a 
growing acceptance of dual citizenship by west European countries to the 
Citizenship of Europe are therefore missing the point.34 Fortunately, the 
consensus remains that the conventional understanding of citizenship as a 
membership of a nation state endures, and thus the legitimization of European 
Citizenship remains problematic.
Citizenship, Democracy, and European Integration
Investigating the emergence of rights in England, Marshall traced the formative 
period of civil rights to the eighteenth century, and the protection of the 
individual’s freedom and property from the state. Then, the political rights of 




























































































through elections. Finally, the social rights of a welfare state provided 
entitlements to social security. According to Marshall, citizenship "is a status 
bestowed by those who are full members of a community. All who possess the 
status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is 
endowed".35 Citizenship, in Marshall’s view, is thus linked to democracy in 
that equality in the application of rights and duties first helped to destroy the 
class hierarchy of medieval England, and then challenged the inequalities of 
twentieth century capitalism.
Marshall’s theory is criticized on several grounds. First, since the 
evolution of citizenship rights in England took place in relative isolation and in 
a culturally homogeneous society, his model requires modification when 
applied to states where these conditions do not obtain. Second, the teleological 
model according to which citizenship rights progressed from political, through 
civic, to social, assumes the culmination of this process in a full welfare state. 
Today, welfare states are under constant pressure from an increasing global 
competition. Third, citizenship rights in the former communist states of CEE 
(and elsewhere) seem to have taken a reversed evolutionary trend: first the 
social rights inherent in the socialist economic systems, then civil rights via the 
increasing challenge to authoritarian regimes from dissidents in the 1970s and 
1980s, and finally the acquisition of political rights after the 1989 
revolutions.36 Finally, the relatively new states — for instance states that 
became independent in the aftermath of Soviet empire37 — have neither the 
time, nor the need to go through a similar evolutionary process. They can 
emulate the Western model, and make adjustments that best fit their present 
demographic, cultural, social and economic conditions.
An alternative to Marshall’s explanation was proposed by Tilly. 
According to Tilly, modem citizenship can be traced to the 1792 French 
Constitution, which granted voting rights to wage-earning males who took an 
oath to defend the nation and constitution. In Tilly’s interpretation, the 
expanding military activity of the revolutionary state increased the need for 
conscription and revenue, and forced state agents to strike bargains with the 
reluctant subjects. Thus, citizenship, defined as a "tie entailing mutual rights 
and obligations between categorically defined persons and the state" was 
established through accords between the state and its subjects. The increasing 
demands of the state and the subsequent inclusion further groups in the 
bargaining process made democracy possible.
This does not mean that all new states fit the same paradigm, nor that 
the bargaining was finished with the establishment of a welfare state. On the 
contrary. On the one hand, the availability of the Western model makes 




























































































contemporary citizenship rights seem to hinge on the extent to which 
globalization undermines the capacity of states to fulfill their commitments.38 
The increasing momentum of European integration, therefore, might weaken 
the bond between the nation-state and the citizens, but only if it can offer a 
viable alternative to the rights and benefits provided by contemporary nation­
states. Since the process of integration involves significant costs to the member 
states, and the eastward enlargement will require additional resources in aid 
and low interest loans, the bond established between the nation-state and its 
self-interested citizens will most likely remain a formidable obstacle to 
European integration.
Concepts and Definitions: Towards a New Theoretical Framework
In an effort to compromise between conventional and post-modem conceptions 
of citizenship, Baldwin-Edwards, Baubock, Heater and Meehan treat 
citizenship as a bundle of rights and obligations which link an individual with 
society.39 Although the substitution of a "society" for the "nation-state" in this 
definition creates opportunities for unconventional conceptualizations of the 
link between citizenship and individuals, the definition fails to explain how and 
by whom rights are guaranteed. The rights anchored in the Citizenship of the 
Union, for example, are conferred on every person holding the nationality of a 
member state, and are guaranteed by the agents of participating states rather 
than EU enforcement mechanisms.40
More importantly, such a conceptualization of citizenship does not help 
to establish a relationship between citizenship, nationhood and democracy. It 
does not incorporate all relevant components these concepts have in common, 
and it takes a procedural or substantial approach, rather than an appropriately 
relational one.41 Building on the work of Charles Tilly, I propose to begin with 
the following concepts:43
State: an organization controlling the means of coercion within a 
delimited territory and exercising a priority in some respects over all other 
organizations within the same territory.43
Polity: the set of relations among the agents of the state and all major 
political actors within the delimited territory.
Rights: enforceable claims, the reciprocal of obligations.
Citizenship: rights and mutual obligations binding state agents and a 





























































































Nationhood and citizenship are linked in that a state establishes a 
category of persons who by virtue of membership in a specific group acquire 
rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state.44 Citizenship is considered broad 
insofar as it extends membership to persons living within the state's bounded 
territory, and equal insofar as its rights and mutual obligations apply to these 
persons.
Citizenship might vary along two dimensions: first, from exclusive to 
inclusive; and second, from primordial to learned.45 Then the primordial and 
exclusive variety of citizenship could be egalitarian in that it is applied to all 
who fit the specific criteria of membership, yet by no means broad because it 
excludes all those who do not fit the criteria. Primordial and inclusive 
citizenship could then be considered broad but by no means egalitarian because 
of the underlying and enduring classification of citizens according to the 
established specific criteria. The learned and exclusive variety of citizenship 
could be considered as broad and egalitarian insofar as new candidates can 
assimilate to the existing culture. Finally, the learned and inclusive variety is 
broad and egalitarian in that the new candidates are willing to adhere to the 




Folk or Ethnic Model: 
expression of an ethnically 
homogeneous society where 
citizenship is acquired by 
descent (Israel)
I.
Imperial Model: facilitates 
integration of different 
people under the domination 
of one national group (the 




Citizenship is acquired by 
birthplace, and 




Citizenship by birth, and 
naturalization through 
adherence to norms and 
rules (Canada, Australia) 
IV.
Any polity should be considered democratic insofar as it establishes 
broad and equal citizenship; provides for binding and transparent consultation 
of citizens with respect to governmental personnel and policies; and guarantees 



























































































Finally, we might want to think of states as falling somewhere along 
four continua on a scale form 0 to 1, where:
a) citizenship can be: narrow (0) to broad (1)
b) citizenship can be: unequal (0) to equal (1)
c) consultation with citizens: none (0) to extensive (1) .
d) protection from arbitrary action: none (0) to extensive (1)
A state then is a complete democracy when rated (1, 1, 1, 1), while a state rated 
(0, 0, 0, 0) is a complete tyranny. A state with (1, 1, 0, 0) rating is a populist 
dictatorship, and so on. For a better orientation, contemporary western 
democracies are likely to be rated somewhere in the neighborhood of (.80, .90, 
.75, ,85).47
II. Citizenship in the West and the East
Differences between contemporary west European and CEE states, as well as 
among CEE states, should caution those who set EU accession standards. First, 
EU members are older states with well-established bureaucracies and accepted 
institutional rules.48 Their conceptions of citizenship evolved gradually, and 
reflect a deeply rooted understanding of nationhood. 9 Second, the capacity of 
EU member states is relatively high, in that they are able to structure inter and 
intra-state relations,50 extract revenue, and maintain low levels of violent 
crime.51 Consequently, western states are well positioned to make changes 
required by the approximation clauses in the Treaty of European Union. 
Finally, the citizenship policies of EU states are to a large extent governed by 
the mutually accepted policies of harmonization (convergence). Since 
harmonization implies mutual concessions one might encounter political 
opposition toward further relaxation of citizenship laws in Britain and France, 
where these laws are relatively inclusive and are extended, with some 
qualifications, to legal immigrants who demonstrate the required degree of 
cultural adaptation. On the other hand in Germany, where citizenship is 
relatively exclusive and derived from the principle of descent (primordial), 
political opposition toward the relaxation of these laws appears less salient.53 
All this makes the Western states are well positioned to make and implement 
changes required by the approximation clauses of the EU.
By contrast, CEE states are relatively new and institutionally unstable, 
and their conceptions of citizenship are being made to fit the contemporary 
demographic, political, cultural, social and international environment. In CEE 
states, the idea of citizenship is therefore seldom rooted in a fully-developed 
understanding of nationhood. Moreover, the capacity of CEE states is usually 
low in that they are rarely able to design and implement strategies that structure 





























































































There are of course significant differences among CEE states. A 
comparison between the Czech Republic and Slovakia suggests that the Czech 
state enjoys a more soundly established governmental and economic 
infrastructure and greater institutional stability than Slovakia. The Czech state 
inherited the infrastructure of the Czechoslovak state, and the Czech lands were 
the more industrially developed region of the federation. In addition, many of 
the perhaps 100,000 Slovaks who decided to stay in the Czech Republic after 
the 1993 breakup had been employed in the state bureaucracy. This benefits the 
Czech state, but deprives Slovakia of qualified bureaucratic personnel. Finally, 
the understanding of Czech nationhood evolved gradually throughout the 
nineteenth century, and was institutionalized during the inter-war 
Czechoslovak Republic; while Slovakia is currently engaged in the processes 
of state and nation-building.56
In short, the comparisons of CEE states with their Western 
counterparts, and of the Czech Republic and Slovakia reveal a paradox. Well- 
established and institutionally-stable states are expected to make only gradual, 
incremental, and in the case of the EU members mutually-convergent changes 
in their citizenship policies; while new, often-nationalizing, poorly-established, 
and institutionally-unstable states are required to make rapid and fundamental 
changes that converge towards artificially-developed standards. Such changes 
could actually destabilize domestic institutions; and even if formally accepted 
by CEE countries, might not create conditions for politically sustainable 
changes. Therefore, if the aim of EU accession strategies is to develop stable 
institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law and the protection of 
human and minority rights, West European standards should serve as a point of 
orientation rather than as absolute requirements.
Citizenship in the Czech Republic and Slovakia
The evaluation of the two countries in Agenda 2000 clearly distinguishes their 
accession status. The Czech Republic, according to the report, has stable and 
properly functioning political institutions, carried out free and fair elections, 
allows the opposition to play a normal part in the operation of institutions, and 
therefore "presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions 
guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of 
minorities". At the same time, the report adds that the judiciary does not 
operate properly, and that the Czech citizenship law discriminates against the 
Roma.58
lo v aki a was the only country among the ten CEE applicant that failed 
^  fulfill the political criteria for accession. In the Commission’s view, the
ititutibnal framework defined in the Slovak Constitution corresponds to that 
parliamentary democracy, but the degree of institutional stability is




























































































unsatisfactory.59 In addition, the report expresses concerns about the 
independence of the judiciary, the government’s use of the secret service, and 
the treatment of the Hungarian and Roma minorities. Agenda 2000 calls the 
elections held in Slovakia free and fair, but does not mention the citizenship 
law.
I will argue below that the reports are correct with respect to 
institutional stability, but should have been more critical regarding the 
treatment of the Roma in the Czech Republic. Changes in the Czech 
Citizenship Law are not only long over due, but they also appear to be political 
sustainable in that their implementation is unlikely to cause institutional 
instability. In Slovakia, however, changes made in citizenship and minority 
policy have already reached the politically sustainable limit, in that neither the 
present government nor its alternatives could make concessions to the 
Hungarian parties without risking the support of their constituencies. The EU’s 
insistence on more profound changes could therefore increase institutional 
instability, and even adversely affect democratization. Once again, this 
suggests the advantages of country-specific, "differentiated integration" and 
"flexible standards", as opposed to the "democratization through incorporation" 
and "set criteria for admission" approach to eastward enlargement. I am not 
suggesting that Slovakia is more democratic, nor that Slovakia rather than the 
Czech Republic should have been considered for the first round of accession 
negotiations by the EU. What I hope will emerge from this inquiry is that a 
country-specific approach in which each applicant is evaluated in the context of 
pre-existing social, political and economic conditions (rather than being 
compared to a set of specific criteria) is beneficial for all parties concerned.
The following comparison of the Czech Republic and Slovakia will 
reveal differences in the definition of nationhood, the nature of citizenship, and 
the degree of institutional stability in the two countries. First, the Czech state is 
relatively old and institutionally stable; while the Slovak state is in the making, 
and each major political and societal actor is struggling to design of 
institutional arrangements which grant it immediate benefits. Consequently, the 
institutional system of the Czech Republic facilitates bargaining and consensus, 
while politics in Slovakia resembles a zero-sum game where the gain of one 
party is automatically the loss of the other. Second, nationhood in the Czech 
Republic has developed in response to state-seeking nationalism, while in 
Slovakia this development has a state-led character.6 During the process of 
state-seeking nationalism, the Czechs developed a deeply-rooted ethnic 
understanding of nationhood and a moderately (if occasionally more than 
moderately) ethnocentric conception of citizenship. Since in Slovakia both 
nationhood and citizenship are evolving, both will be shaped by the bargaining 
process between domestic political actors and external third parties (the EU). 




























































































exclusionary/ethnic, or inclusionary/civic character will depend upon the 
outcome of a bargaining process in which the EU could play a decisive role.
The Czech Republic
The Czech state is relatively old, and the definition of Czech nationhood is well 
established. The tradition of Czech statehood extends to the Czech Kingdom 
(Zeme Koruny Ceske), while its institutional foundations can be traced in part 
to the inter-war Czechoslovakia, and in part to the Czechoslovak Federation.61 
The rules of the political game are well defined, anchored in the Czech 
Constitution, and respected by the involved parties. At the same time, however, 
state capacity to collect revenue and control violent crime and corruption is 
relatively low.62
The contemporary understanding of Czech nationhood evolved in 
response to the continuous presence of its strong and often assertive German 
neighbor. The Czech national revival had a state-seeking character, and its 
definition of Czech nationhood was ethnic, defined against the "hereditary 
enemies of the Czechs", the Germans.63 The primary work that framed the 
developing understanding of Czech nationhood was Frantisek Palacky’s 
interpretation of Czech history, in which a systematic distinction was drawn 
between "us", the Czechs and "them", the Germans, and the historical 
misfortunes of the Czechs linked to the presence of the Germans.64 Palacky’s 
had a profound influence on late nineteenth-century Czech national revivalists, 
artists and writers, who helped to authenticate it.65 The popular anti-German 
attitudes were exacerbated during the First World War, and peaked during the 
Protektorat and the subsequent expulsion of the Sudeten Germans in 1945. 6
While the dominant understanding of Czech nationhood in 1918 was 
firmly ethnocentric, Czechoslovak President Tomas G. Masaryk and his 
associates envisioned the new, multi-ethnic state built on liberal democratic 
principles. Hence, the citizenship and language laws of 1921 were relatively 
moderate, assimilationist and inclusive.67 During the discussion of the 
Language Law in 1921, parliamentary deputies argued that it would be 
intelligent to exceed the minimal requirements for protection of minorities 
stipulated by the Treaty of St. Germain, in order to protect the Czech liberal- 
democratic image from complaints by German and Hungarian minorities.68
Twentieth-century Czech history supports Brubaker’s argument that an 
ethnocentric understanding of nationhood, once developed, tends to endure. 
Despite the interwar language and citizenship laws, there was no 
comprehensive strategy to include or assimilate the German and Hungarian 
minorities. On the contrary, ethnic claims in regions with high concentration of 




























































































democratic Czechoslovakia expelled nearly three million ethnic Germans, of 
whom (according to the Czech-German Historical Commission) some 18.000- 
30,000 died in the process. Those Germans and Hungarians who remained in 
Czechoslovakia (communist after 1948) had no citizenship rights until 1952. In 
today’s Czech Republic, human rights organizations note ongoing 
discrimination of the Roma minority, racially motivated attacks on Asians and 
Africans, the pattern of government inaction against these trends, and the 
maintenance of a discriminatory citizenship law. While some scholars and 
politicians argue that the sizable Slovak minority living in the Czech Republic 
does not suffer from discrimination and therefore the Czech understanding of 
nationhood is actually civic, it has to be pointed out that Slovaks who opted for 
the Czech citizenship in 1993 are culturally and linguistically assimilated, and 
make no claims that would bear on the interests of the Czech majority. Treating 
their situation as an example of Czech tolerance is thus misleading.70
Although problems with the Roma are by no means unique to the Czech 
Republic, the increasing number of racially-motivated physical attacks is 
disturbing. Human rights organizations attribute this trend to the lenient 
treatment of perpetrators. According to the International Helsinki Federation 
(IHF), in 1994 there were 62 attacks on the Roma, in 1995 90, in 1996 157, and 
233 in the first eleven months of 1997.71 Between 1990 and 1996, seventeen 
Roma were killed in such attacks, and several hundred more were injured. But, 
of more than two hundred persons accused of these acts, fewer then one 
hundred were convicted.72 Racially-motivated violence in the Czech Republic 
does not exclude foreigners from Asia, Africa, or the Middle East. The murder 
of a Sudanese student in Prague in November 1997 attracted attention to the 
problem of racial intolerance in Czech Republic, and a number of politicians 
took part in a public demonstration against racism and xenophobia.73 A few 
months later the son of the Libyan Ambassador was severely beaten by 
skinheads in the city of Brno.74
Another example of ethnic exclusion was occasioned by a July 1997 
television program that depicted Gypsy immigrants living a prosperous life in 
Canada. The documentary sparked a massive exodus of Roma from the Czech 
Republic. Certain Czech politicians suggested that the documentary was the 
best thing the TV station has done this far, and the program should be aired 
more often. The Major of Ostrava, Jana Lickova, even offered to pay $600 
toward the air ticket of every Roma who decided to leave her city.75
Czech authorities began to deal with the problem conceptually in 1995, 
in response to increasing criticism from the UNHCR, OSCE and the EU. In 
1996 the parliament passed a resolution denouncing racism and xenophobia in 
the Czech Republic, and 120 new positions were created for specialists in the 




























































































in the work of the judiciary. Cases of racially motivated acts were often 
characterized as "personal fights", and light sentences sent the message that 
such crimes were not considered serious.77 According to the director of Nadace 
Nova Skola, "there is bias in the treatment of Roma in every sphere of life in 
the Czech Republic, from the top government officials all the way down to the 
owner of the village pub".78 In sum, while most anti-Roma activities are 
attributed to a small group of extremists and the far-right Czech Republican 
Party (CSR), Czech governments have done little, and the Czech public by its 
silence implicitly approves the present state of affairs.
The Citizenship Law of 1 January 1993 seems to fit the ethnocentric 
and exclusionary definition of Czech nationhood, and is criticized by 
international organizations such as the UNHCR, OSCE and the Council of 
Europe.79 The law temporarily excluded from Czech citizenship all Slovaks 
who had permanent residence in the Czech Republic, it created a number of 
stateless people, and lends itself to discrimination against the Roma.80 Article 
18 granted Slovak citizens the opportunity to apply for Czech citizenship, 
provided that the applicant had resided for at least two years in the Czech 
Republic, had a certificate of exemption from Slovak citizenship, and had no 
criminal record for the past five years. Thus arose a class of people who were 
ineligible for Slovak citizenship, failed to meet Czech requirements, and 
became stateless. Moreover, even individuals who were arrested but not 
persecuted were automatically disqualified from Czech citizenship.81 Only on 
April 1996 was the law amended, and the Ministry of Interior empowered to 
waive the five-year clean-record requirement. Yet Roma were often given no 
information or were given misleading guidance regarding citizenship issues. 
Out of 255 surveyed Roma who were not granted Czech citizenship, 80% were 
long-term residents, 50% had clean criminal records, only 19 had been 
convicted of serious crimes and 26 of petty offenses.82
The ethnocentric conception of Czech nationhood continues to shape 
the understanding of Czech citizenship. At the same time, the Czech state 
continues to maintain its liberal democratic character, and certain outstanding 
political figures have moderated the exclusionary character of Czech 
citizenship.83 Given the liberal democratic tradition of Czech statehood, the 
relative stability of Czech institutions, and the general desire of Czechs to join 
the West, moderation of citizenship policy is the most viable option at this 
time. The EU, for instance, should insist on implementation and enforcement of 
laws that facilitate the exercise of inclusionary and equal citizenship rights for 
the Roma. Such laws have to be implemented now, in order to provide a 
sufficient time for the society that has to adjust to the new, formal rules of 
interaction. A failure to moderate the Czech conception of citizenship today 
might lead to an increase in the resentment of Czechs against certain kinds of 





























































































Compared to the Czech Republic, Slovakia is a newer and less stable state, 
inhabited by an ethnically more heterogeneous population, and engaged in a 
much more thorough-going process of state and nation-building.84 Activities 
aimed at the construction of Slovak nationhood are primarily state-led,85 
though the process of nation-building includes competing conceptions of 
Slovak nationhood. The understanding of Slovak nationhood remains 
ambiguous, and the conception of Slovak citizenship is malleable and often 
inconsistent with governmental policies. Under these conditions, the EU’s role 
in shaping the understanding of Slovak nationhood and the conception of 
citizenship could be significant, and the EU’s influence is likely to increase 
with the flexibility of accession criteria. This does not mean that the Meciar 
government should be rewarded for its democratic deficit, but that an explicit 
recognition of its achievements in the sector of citizenship policy could be 
advantageous for both Slovakia and the EU.
The contemporary Slovak state is being built on the ruins of the former 
federation, even though the Czech state inherited most of federal state’s 
infrastructure. Slovakia lacks the option of building a new state on a pre­
existing paradigm of liberal democracy, and lacks political figures such as 
Masaryk or Havel who could shape the democratic character of the new state. 
The contemporary Slovak state is also relatively weak in its capacity to extract 
revenue, control violent crime and corruption, and structure internal relations.86 
All of this creates favorable conditions for institutional instability, which is 
reflected in incoherent decisions in domestic and foreign policies in general, 
and in citizenship policy in particular.
Contemporary efforts to construct and authenticate a credible 
conception of Slovak nationhood represent a range of interests. Both the 
contemporary understanding of Slovak nationhood, and the conception of 
citizenship therefore lack coherence. While the initial phase of the nineteenth- 
century Slovak national revival was similar to the Czech experience, the Slovak 
revivalists lacked a "hereditary enemy" against whom to identify. The Slovak 
national revival was stifled after the 1848 revolution, and the Slovaks lacked 
scholars of Palacky’s stature to frame Slovak nationhood. Moreover, whereas 
in the Czech lands professional associations, artists and writers helped to 
disseminate and authenticate the sources of Czech nationhood in the nineteenth 
century, until the 1930s Slovakia lacked such groups of intellectuals.87 Most 
urban centers in nineteenth-century Slovakia (Felvidek) were inhabited by 
Hungarians and Germans. After the 1866 Ausgleich, the Slovak-speaking 
population of the monarchy was subjected to Magyarization.88 In 1918 the 




























































































and until the late 1930s the Slovak National Party (SNS) was unable to gain a
89significant electoral support.
Efforts to create and authenticate new sources of identification are 
controversial and vulnerable. In spring 1996, for instance, Milan Durica, a 
history professor at the University of Bologna, published a controversial book 
financed by PHARE. Durica’s book, Dejiny slovenska a slovakov (The History 
of Slovakia and the Slovak People), which depicted the 1939 Slovak Republic 
as liberal, and the treatment of Jews during the war as lenient, was intended to 
serve as a supplementary high school history textbook. After criticisms from 
the Slovak Academy of Sciences, teachers’ associations, Jewish organizations, 
and the EU, Meciar was forced to make a publically announce regarding the 
removal of the work from schools.90
The revived Slovak National Party proposed projects of law that would 
allocate state funds for a traveling exhibition of "Slovakia’s Written Heritage", 
or would shift competencies over history, language and literature curricula 
from the Ministry of Education to Matica Slovenska.91 Both initiatives were 
rejected under pressure from the media and teachers associations. Inflammatory 
speeches of Slovak nationalists about the role of Hungary in Slovak history are 
immediately publicly analyzed and refuted.92 In short, the construction and 
authentication of a consistent and uncontested conception of Slovak 
nationhood — whether ethnocentric or civic -- appears unlikely in the near 
future.93
The contradictions of Slovak politics are further exacerbated by 
institutional instability. The rules of the game structuring the interaction of 
political actors are outlined in the constitution, but have not taken hold in the 
Slovak political life. The Meciar government’s program after the 1994 
elections, for instance, declared that "party diversity is an attribute of 
democracy which the party [his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)] 
supports", yet the same program pointed out that "diversity will not be allowed 
to lead to a permanent political crisis whether in open or hidden form".94 The 
latter conception of "diversity" prevails in contemporary Slovak politics. It is 
reflected in the confrontation between the prime minister and the president, in 
the exclusion of opposition parties from parliamentary committees (including 
the controlling organ of the secret service), and the illegal expulsion of unruly 
members of the governing coalition from parliament.95 In 1995 and 1996 the 
Constitutional Court ruled on eleven measures, of which it found nine to be 
unconstitutional. In 1997, the Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional the 
actions of the Interior Minister Gustav Krajci during the May 1997 
Referendum, and the impeachment of a former HZDS MP Gaulieder.96 Yet, the 
legal case against Minister Krajci was dismissed by a Bratislava district 




























































































this took place after the government memorandum accompanying the 
application of the Slovak Republic to the EU proclaimed: "Developments in the 
Slovak Republic show that democratic institutions are firmly anchored and that 
despite various political changes the constitutional system is stabilized".97
Inconsistencies in the construction of Slovak nationhood coupled with 
institutional instability are also noticeable in the domestic and foreign policies 
of the Slovak government. The 1993 Constitution was written in the "name of 
the Slovak nation", which provoked an outcry from the Hungarian and other 
minorities.98 At the same time, the 1993 Citizenship Law has an inclusionary 
and civic character. The law permits any person who by 31 December 1992 
was a citizen of the Czechoslovak Federation to claim Slovak citizenship, and 
permits dual citizenship.99 In another instance, the governmental coalition 
passed a discriminatory Language Law — parts of which were ruled 
unconstitutional — at the same time Slovakia signed the Citizenship of the 
Union agreement.100
Efforts to establish favorable conditions for broad and equal citizenship 
are likely to face obstacles in new, multi-ethnic, and institutionally unstable 
states such as Slovakia. First, the state’s inability to structure internal relations 
opens opportunities for political entrepreneurs to forward ambitious claims. 
Second, in such circumstances political entrepreneurs are likely to make claims 
on behalf of the respective ethnic constituencies.101 Third, such claims, more 
often than not, will bear on the interests of other ethnic groups, and can lead to 
ethnic discord and polarization. Since neither the understanding of nationhood 
nor the conception of citizenship has yet attained clear contours, the EU 
strategies could play an important role. Therefore, if the EU desires to maintain 
its influence over Slovakia in the future, it should not try to isolate Slovakia, 
should avoid statements and policies that can be exploited by Slovak 
nationalists who oppose integration,102 and should set criteria that take into 
account the limits of change.
In short, while the EU is in a position to set relatively high standards for 
integration in the Czech case, Slovakia, at least for the time being, should be 
held to less demanding standards. The relative stability of the Czech state 
makes high standards of accession attainable without threatening the 
destabilization of institutions, while the EU’s insistence on high standards in 
Slovakia might empower the nationalists. Flexible criteria and country-specific 




























































































Conclusion: Citizenship, Democracy, and European Integration in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia
Using the scheme for the evaluation democracy proposed above, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia could be evaluated as follows:
The Czech Republic:
Citizenship: Narrow to broad 0.5
Citizenship: Unequal to equal 0.3 
Consultation with citizens 0.8
Protection from arbitrary action 0.7
The Roma are the only significant and problematic minority group in the Czech 
Republic. If one agrees with Ralf Dahrendorf that "the true test of the strength 
of citizenship rights is heterogeneity",103 the Roma minority is the true test of 
Czech citizenship. Thus far the Czechs barely manage to get a passing grade.
The high marks for consultation with the citizens and for protection of 
citizens from arbitrary action suggest a relatively high degree of institutional 
stability in the Czech Republic. Therefore a change toward more inclusive and 
egalitarian citizenship policy is likely to be politically and socially 
sustainable.104 Thus there is no reason for the Czech government to further 
postpone the signing and ratification of more than thirty UN and EU documents 
concerning human rights.105 Neither should Canada or Britain hesitate about 
the reinstatement of visa requirements for Czech citizens in case of another 
exodus of the Roma. The EU should push for a more inclusive and equal 
conception of citizenship in the Czech Republic now, since once the Czech 
Republic becomes a full member state, it might be too late to moderate the 
Czechs’ ethnocentric understanding of nationhood.
Slovakia’s citizenship laws are broad, yet there are problems 
concerning equality. Since the proportion of minorities in Slovakia is more 
than twice as great as in the Czech Republic, a higher grade for the degree of 
equality seems justified. In the area of consultation with citizens, the two 
elections were ruled free and fair, and one should not blame Meciar for the 
opposition s lackluster performance. It is true, however, that privatization in
Slovakia:
Citizenship: Narrow to broad 
Citizenship: Unequal to equal 0.5 
Consultation with citizens 































































































Slovakia lacks transparency, and state property rewards powerful individuals 
for party loyalty. Finally, cases like the abduction of the president’s son. the 
removal of Gaulieder from the parliament, the sabotage of the May 1997 
referendum, and the dismissal of Minister Krajci’s case by a district procurator 
suggest that the protection of citizens from arbitrary action in Slovakia is 
inadequate.
Since Slovakia rather than the Czech Republic is the true test of 
alternatives to the EU strategy of eastward enlargement, it seems reasonable to 
ask what should be done regarding its alleged democratic deficit. I propose to 
take as the point of departure Tilly’s argument that citizenship is related to 
democracy in that it engenders an ongoing bargaining process between state 
agents and societal actors over rights and obligations.'06 If so, the assumption 
that a simple government change will repair Slovakia’s democratic deficit is 
wishful thinking. It can be improved only through incremental changes that 
decentralize political power, decrease uncertainties in the interaction of 
political and societal actors, and lead them to accept the rules of the game as 
the best possible option for all parties.107 Only an electorate that is actively 
engaged in the bargaining process with state agents can accomplish such a 
systemic change. International isolation of Slovakia is also not desirable at this 
point, because external actors could play a decisive role in shaping Slovakia’s 
institutional transformation.108 Harsh words like those of Mr. Oostlander might 
strengthen popular support for the extreme right, nationalist faction of the 
ruling coalition.109 Since the democratic deficit of Slovakia is not a simple 
result lack of protection from the state’s arbitrary actions, but rather of the lack 
of public awareness of this fact. A viable EU strategy would provide time for 
and facilitate the internal shake-up of the Slovak electorate that would activate 
the bargaining process described by Tilly.
The first part of such an EU strategy — buying time for the reduction of 
the democratic deficit — could be accomplished by including Slovakia in the 
enlargement process subject to periodic evaluation of progress made in the 
correction of specified problem areas. In order to facilitate an internal shake-up 
in Slovakia, EU strategies should exert pressure on the new industrial elites. 
Therefore, the EU should be more selective in areas such as 1) steel export 
quotas, because Slovak steel comes from a plant owned by Meciar’s 
supporters; 2) monitoring of PHARE, so no new fascism-promoting history 
textbooks can be printed using EU money, and 3) the stabilization package, 
where distribution should be extended over time and installments tied to 
changes made in the development of civil society.110
In short, if the aim of EU accession strategies is to develop stable 
institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law and the protection of 




























































































orientation rather than a template for impossibly demanding accession criteria. 
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